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ASPEN WA'TER INC, 
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and 
lDAIIO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
1 
) DOCKET NUMBER 1399-2009 
) 
) DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER 
1 
FEB 2 3 2009 
DECISION 'NDUSTRIAL COI~MISSION 
Benefits are ALLOWED effective 11i2/2008. 
The employer's experiet~ce rated account IS CHARGEABLE on the claim, in accordance with 
$72-1 35 1 (2)(a) of the Idaho Employment Security Law. 
The Eligibility Determit~ation dated 1211 512008 is hereby REVERSED. 
HISTORY OF THE CASE 
The above-entitled matter was heard by Brent Marchbanks, Appeals Examiner of the Idaho 
Department of Labor, on 1/28/2009, by telephone in the City of Boise, in accordance with 
$72-1368(6) of the Idaho Employmet~t Security Law. 
The claimant, MATTHEW S ADAMS, testified on his own behalf. 
The employer, ASPEN WATER INC., presented testimony from Terry Sidwell and Mellissa 
Miller. 
The record was held open for the parties to submit additional documet~tation. After an 
opportunity for comnct~ts  or objection, the additional docume~~ts were admitted to the record as 
Exhibits 9 and 10, respectively. 
DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMMER - 1 of 7 
The issues before the Appeals Examiner are whether the employer's account is properly 
chargeable for experience rating purposes for benefits paid to the claitnarit, t~cctirdit~g to 
$72- 1351(2)(aj of the Idaho Employment Security Law und whether unetnployment is due to the 
claimant quitting voluntarily and, if so, whether with good cause connected with the employment 
-OR- being discharged and, if so, whether for miscot~duet in connection with the employment, 
according to $72-1366(5) of the ldaho Employment Security Law. 
FINDINGS O F  FACT 
Based on the exhibits and testimony in the record, the following facts are found: 
1 fhc  clatmant worked as a watet systems tt~stallcr for thts employer from Septembcr o r  
2007 unttl 11/3/2008 
2. In the first four of the five calendar quarters preceding the one in which the claimant 
applied for benefits, this employer paid the claimant more wages than did any other. 
3. The trigger for the claimant's separation from employment occurred on his last day. On 
the day, he did leave work after lunch, spending his time on personal business getting a 
driver's license renewal. 
4. The employer maintains that the claimant voluntarily quit the job by leaving the work 
place after only working 1 ?& hours without notice or permission. 
5. In fact, the claimant was discharged. He had no intention of quitting 
6, The claimant was on light duty restriction at the time, following a work related injury. 
The docunientatiot~ submitted by the employer as proof that the claimant only worked 1 
% hour that day were the logs used to track time spent driving a company vehicle a id  
then time spent on installatiolis themselves. The claimant's time that day was spent in 
the office, given his work restrictions. 
7, The employer's policies (a copy of which were submitted by the claimant) detail that 
two cot~secutive days of no calllno show is considered to signal a voluntary quit. In 
response, the employer suggests that the policy manual given the claimant was only a 
"guideline" from the corporate office in Salt Lake City. (Exhibits 9,lO) 
8. He had no assigned work that afternoon. Although never before for an entire afiemoon, 
the claimant gave unchallenged testimony that it ulas common practice for he and the 
other installer to take personal time off when there were no it~stallations to do. 
9. The policies also detail a "progressive" disciplinary process whereby, in most situations. 
employee performat~ce and disciplit~ary issues are addressed through a sencs of steps of 
warnings and counselings. 
10. Since the separation, the employer has "tnade adjustments" so that the business operates 
with only one, rather than two installers. 
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The ldaho Supreme Court has indicated that when deciding whether an unemployment insurance 
claimant's unemployment is due to the fact that he left his employment voluntarily, the mattcr of  
the intent of the worker to sever the employment relationship is an essential consideration. (See 
Totorica vs. Western Equipment CQ., 88 ldaho 534 (1965) and Coates vs. Bingharn Mcehanical 
- 
Sc Metal Products, Ine., 96 Idaho 606 (1975) and Gray vs. Brasch & Miller (:onstmction Co:, 
102 Idaho 14 (1981).) 
Section 72-1366(5) of the idaho Employment Security Law provides in pertinent part, that a 
claimant is ineligible for unernploy~?ient compensation benefits if he or she was discharged for 
nlisconduct in connection with employment. The issue is not whether the employer had 
reasonable grounds for discharging claimant, but rather whether the reasons for dischat-ge 
constituted "misconduct" in connection with claimant's employment such that claimant can he 
denied unemployment benefits. The two issues are separate and distinct. Beaty vs. City of Idaho 
m, llOIdaho891,719P.2d 1151 (1986). 
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on the 
e~nployer and, where the burden is not met, benefits 111ust he awarded the claimant, Roll vs. C& 
of Middle-, 105 ldaho 22,665 P.2d 721 (1983); Parker vs. St. Maries Plwvood, 101 ldaho 415, 
614 P.2d 955 (1980); Hart vs. Deary High S c h d ,  126 Idaho 550, 552, 887 P.2d 1057, 1059 
(1994). The ldaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct as a willful, intentional disregard of 
the c~nploycr's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or  a disregard of statid:cds 
of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees. John vs. S.1-i. Kress and 
Company, 78 ldaho 544, 307 P.2d 21 7 (1957). 
For misconduct in standard-of-behavior cases, a two-pronged test has been delineated: ( I )  
whether the employee's conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by the etnployer; 
and (2) whether the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable in the particular case. 
However, the employer's expectations must be communicated to the employee. Davis vs. 
Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 695 P.2d 1231 (1984); Euckett vs. ldaho Department of 
Corrections, 107 ldaho 1022,695 P.2d 407 (1985). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given that the accepted practice was for installers to take personal time in the afternoon if there 
was no installation work to do, the employer's stated policy that it takes two consecutive 
incidents of no callino show to signal a voluntary separation, and the claimant's testimony that 
he was not intending to quit, the claimant's separation from this job is most accurately 
characterized as a discharge. 
The claimant was discharged for reasons other than misconduct connected with employment. 
The employer's policies lay out a procedure to notify employees that performance or conduct 
issues are violations of policy or the best interests of the employer and jeopardize employment. 
Since the claimant had never been written up or warned that the informal time off practiced by 
him and the other installer, it is inappropriate to label the events of his final day as any kind of 
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&%, * 
*>ae- gxt<.*. 
egegio,s violation % i t  justified overriding the progressi~ &isciiplinary pro~cdut-es in 
favor of irnniedi.atc ternxination. 
The F ~ t s  that the clairnant had recently suffered a work related injury and that the cmploycr was 
able to adjust their operation to get the work done with half the number of installers, suggests the 
employer worild be motivated to end the claimant's employmellt for reasons other than his 
purported resignation 
The clatmant was dtscharged, but not for misconduct 
Benefits are allowed 
The employer's account must be charged on the clatm 
Appeals Examiner 
Examinador de Apelactones 
Date of Mailing 
-. -- 3 - L( - 6 q - Last Day T o  Appeal 
Feeha De Envio Ultimo Dia Para  Apelar 
APYEAI, RIGHTS 
You have FObXTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILLNG to file a written appeal wtth 
the ldaho lndustrtal Comtnlssto~~. The appeal must be taken or niatled to 
Jndustnal Commission 
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
Or cielivcred in person to: Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Or transmitted by facsimile to: (208) 332-7558 
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If the appeal is mailed, i t  n,?!be postmark& no later lltarl the last Lwto appeal, An appeal filed 
by facsimile transmission must be received by the Commission by 5:00 11.111.. Mountain 'f'inle, on 
the last day to appeal. A Facsimile trans~nission received after 5:00 p.m. will bc deemed reccivcd by 
the Clomntission on the next business day. .4 late a& will be distnis~ed. rlppeds lilcd by any 
means with the Appeals Bureau or a Delxrtment of Labor Local Office will  of he accepted by tile 
Commission. 7%) EMPLOYERS WHO ARE INCORI'OR~f TED: Ifyou file on appeal witiz the 
Idaho Industrial Lbmmission, the appeul must be signed hy 11 corporuie ojjicer or legal counsel 
licensed to practice in the State of'ldaho the siguature rnusf ilzclzcde fhe individuill 's rifle. The 
Commis.sion u~iii not consider appeals submitted by empluyer represeittiitives who are nor iittorney.7. 
Ifyou request a heaving before the Commis,rion or pa-mission tofile a legal brieJ you murf make 
rhe'se reyuest,y ihi-ough legal counsel licensed to practice in the S'tule o f i h h o .  Questions .shoufd he 
clivecied r o  the Iduho 1ndu.striul Commission, U~~emplqynzent Appeal.?, (208) 334-6024. 
IS no appeal is filed, this decision will become final and cannot he changed. TO CLAIMANT: If 
this decision is changed, any benefits paid will be subject to repayment. 1f an appeal is filed, yo11 
should continue to report on your claim as long as you are unemployed. 
Usted tiene CATORCE (14) DIAS DESDE E;: FECtJA I>E ENVIO para archivar urla apelacion 
escrita con la Comision lndustrial de Idaho. I,a apelacion debe scr llevada o enviada a: 
Industrial Commission 
Judicial Division, IDOI, Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
0 ser entregada en persona a: 
Idaho Industrial Commissiorl 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Boise. Idaho 83712 
0 puede enviarla por fax a: (208) 332-7558. 
Si la apelacion es cnviada por correo, la fecha en el sello del correo debe ser no m k  tarde de la 
fecha dcl ultimo dia en que pucde apelar. apelacion tardada sera dcscartada. Apelacioncs 
archivadas con la Agencia de Apelaciones o con la Oficina de Empleo serin aceptadas por la 
Comision. Una apelacion archivada por medio de fax debe ser recibida por la comision no mas 
tarde de las 5:00 P.M. Hora Standard de la Montaiia, del ultimo dia en que pucde apelar. Una 
transmisi6n de fax recibida despuks de las 5:00 P.M. se considerari recibida por la cornision, hasta 
el proximo dia habil. EMPLEADORES QUE SON ZNCORPORADOS: Si una apelacidn es 
archivada en la Comisidlz Industrial de Idaho, la apelacidn tiene que serjrmada por un ojcial o 
representante designado y la $ m a  debe inclzcir el titulo del individuo. Si solicita una audiencia 
ante la Comisidn I~zdzutrial, o permiso para archival- un eso-ito legal, istu solicitud se debera de 
hacer por medio de un abogado con licelzcia para PI-acticar en el estado de Idaho. Pregunta.7 
dehen ser dirigidas a la Comisidn Industrial de Idaho, Unemploymelzt Appeals, (208) 334-6024. 
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SI ninguna apelacicin se ,.-hiva, csta ~iecisibr~ se,rii 1:1 iir~al 4 :*I poi11.i camhiarsc. A l ,  
RF:CL,I%MANTE: Si esta decisiiin se camltia, toiios 10s hencficios pag;iiios estal-im sujetos a 
reembolso. Si una apelaci6n se archiva, ~~stect  deberiii de continuar reportando cn su reclamo 
rnienlras estt: desemplcado. 
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APPEAI .S BUREAU 
IDAFIO DEPAIZTMENT OF IABOR 
317 WEST MAIN STREET I BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720 
(208) 332-3572 l(X00) 621-4938 
FAX (208) 334-6440 
CERTIFICATE 01 SERVICE 
1 hereby certlfy that on E D  @ 4 2009 , a true and eonect copy of 
Decision of AppeaIs Examiner was served by ~egular Unrted States mall upon each of the 
folfowlng 
MM17-IEW S iZDAMS 
4932 N RIVERFRONT PI. 
GARDEN CITY ID 83714 
ASPEN WATER WC 
149 S ADKJNS WAY STE 105 
MEKIIIIAN ID 83642 
ASPEN WATER INC 
1960 S MILESTONE DR E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84104 
cc: Idaho Department of Labor Meridian Local Office 
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FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET 
lo mOM: 
JUDIClAL DIVISION TERRY SIDWELL 
(:OMPINY: OATF: 
WDUSIXAL COhMSSION 2/17/09 
YXX NUMBER TGTAl. NO. 0:' T.%CFS INCI.Ui7:NC COVI'A 
332-7558 5 
P l i i l h E  NUUI)b:R: SCNUBXIS RI%)IRtXCt NCMBb:R: 
FZ; NXIT AUAMS vs ASPEN WA'~P.R YOOR BTSEX-P.NC~~ NUMBPA: 
Aspen Water wishes to appeal the decision made by the Idaho department of Labor regarding Matthew 
S Adams vs. Aspen Water Inc. Docket number 13942009 
it is our belief that the basis on which t h ~ s  claim was reversed is not accurate. Please review the facts 
below. % s 7  
REBUTTAL OF FINDINGS OF FACT 3 g y  - E d -  r-- 
2. Matt Adams was paid less than $100.00 more per pay period than the other installer. That is not $ W1 
uncommon based on experience and time with the company. % ! = X e t l  c9. 32 ua 
-.  
3. On the claimant's last day, he leFt the office a t  8:30am to for an eighteen minute service call, took his$ 
lunch break, and then went to the court house to change his address on his drivefs license so that he 
could vote. Claimant returned to the office at 12:25 and then turned in his work from the previous 
Friday and that day; a few minutes later, he wasgone. 
4. The employer did terminate Matt for leaving work without proper notification. Whether R was 
voluntary or involuntary, Matt Adams left. Employee Handbook Section 3.7 States "If employees have 
unexpected personal business to take care of, they must notify their direct supewisor to d i ~ u s s  the 
time away from work and make arrangements as necessary. Personal business should be conducted on 
the employee's personal time. Employees who do not adhere to the break policy may be subject to 
disciplinary action, up t o  and includinrr termination." 
5. Ok, Matt Adams was fired for disrespectful conduct and insubordination. 
6. The claimant was only in the office for about half of an hour in the morning. If he had been in the 
office that afternoon, work would not have been lost. He left for a setvice call, was gone all morning, 
returned his van, and then left for the day. The Mileage and Job log was not only to track time spent 
driving and time on installations, but also to keep track o f  the installers themselves, w, that they have 
some accountability for their day. Matt Adams admitted t o  having gone to the courthouse in the 
companyvan, without permission, to take care of personal business, and then he came back to the 
office and parked the companyvan andleft without notifying anyone that he was leaving for the day. 
7. This decision w a s m  based on policy (4.2). This is sometkmg that Matt Adams is claiming. The 
decision was based on policy 3.7 and Section 4 (please review). 
8. What company is going to allow an employee to just leave unannounced for an entire afternoon? 
We strive for good customer service and calls come in daily for cooler service. If Matt Adams had been 
in the office, he would have had work to do. We occasionally allow employees to take care of personal 
business during the day, if it is only for a short period of time and does not interrupt the work day, if 
they get prior mrmission to  do so. Examplel run to the bank to deposit pay check, drop off homework 
to child's school, drop mail off at post office, etc. 
9. According to Section 3.13 of our employee handbook we are a progressive company, however, some 
circumstances require immediate termination and this was definitely one of them. This kind of 
insubordination cannot be tolerated by anyone at any level of this company. That i s  why section 3.7 and 
Section 4, both state "which may result in corrective action, up to and includinrr termination of 
empJoyment." 
10. We have been able to survive with only one installer, even though at times it is difficult. We would 
have preferred to keep Matt Adams with the company; however, we cannot be taken advantage of. 
3.6 Lunch Periods 
Employees are allowed a one-hour or a 30- minute lunch break. Lunch breiiks generally 
are taken between the hours of 11:W am and 2:00 p.m. on a staggered schedule so that 
your absence does not create a probIem for co-workers or clients. A supervisor or 
Executive Staff member must approve long lunch requests. Part time employees are 
allowed to lake a 10-minute break instead of a lunch break. Though any lunch break 
lasting more than 10-minutes iu duration requires the employee to clock out and in. 
Food is to be kept in the break mom unless authorized by your immediate supervisor. 
The fridge, raicmwave, coffee pot, etc. are available for your convenience. Maintaining 
these items and keeping them clean are up to each of us. Wash your own dishes, empty 
garbase, and remove your old f w d  from the fridge on a daily basis. 
3.7 Break Periods 
Aspen Water he .  provides breaks for employees during production activities at the 
folIowing times: Day staff is provided with a 10-minute break 1&00 am, 12:00 pm 
(lunch or break) and 2:00 pm. Eightshift staff is provided with a 10-minute break at 4:W 
pm, 6:00 pm (luoch or break) and 8:00 pm. Any deviation from the allotted time frame, 
unless approved by your supervisor, is considered a violation of this poIicy, which may 
result in corrective action, up to and including terntination. 
If employees have unexpected personal business to take care of, they must notify their 
direct supervisor to discuss the time away from work and make arrangements as 
necessary. Personal business should be conducted on the employee's personal time. i 
Employees who do not adhere to the break policy may be subject to discipkary action, 
up to and incIuding termination. 
\ 
3.8 Personnel Files 
Employee personnel files include the following: job application, W4, job description, 
resume, records of participation in training events, salary history, records of disciplinary 
action and documents related to employee performance reviews, coaching, and 
mentoring. 
Personnel files are the property of Aspen water Inc. and access to the information is 
restricted. Management personnel of Aspen Water Inc. who have a legitimate reason to 
review the file are allowed to do so. (in compliance with HfPAA reguIations) 
Employees who wish to review their own file should contact the General Manger or 
Human Resources. With reasonable advance notice, the employee may review histher 
personnel file in the Company's office in  the presence of a member of the Executive 
Staff. 
Section 4 
Standards of Conduct 
The work rules and standards of conduct for Aspen Water h c .  are important, and the 
Company regards them seriously. All employees are urged to beeome familiar with these 
rules and standards. In addition, employees are expected to follow the rules and 
standards fg-lly in doing their own jobs and conducting the Company's business. 
Please note &at any employee who deviates from these rules and standards will be 
subject to corrective action, up to and including termination of empIoyment (See Section 
3.12. Corrective Action). 
While not intended to list all the forms of behavior that are considered unacceptable in 
the workplace, rhe foIlowing are examples of rule infractions or misconduct that may 
result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment. 
Theft or inappropriate removal or possession of property; 
Falsification of timekeeping records (See Section 5.2, Timekeeping) 
Working under the influence of alcohol or itlegal drugs (See Section 4.6, 
Substance Abuse). 
Possession of, distribution, sate, transfer, or use of alcohol or illegal dmgs in the 
workplace, or at work related activities. (See Section 4.6, Substance Abuse). 
Fighting or threatening violence in the workplace; 
Boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace; 
NegIigence or improper conduct leading to damage of company-owned or 
customer-owned property; 
-' . Insubordloation o r  other d~sresprctf~ll cond~lct: 
- '--- - - - __- _ .  
- 
. V~olation of s-fcty or health nilts; 
Smoking in the workplace, or within 25 feet of the door (According to Utah Clean 
Air act). 
Sexual or other uolawfiil or unwelcome harassment (See Section 4.3, Harassment, 
IncIuding Sexual Harassment). 
Excessive absenteeism or multiple absences without prior notice (See also, 
Section 4.1 AttendanceRunctuality and 4.2, Absence without notice); 
Unauthorized use of telephones, or other company-owned equipment (See Section 
4.4, Telephone equipment for purposes other than business (i.e. playing games on 
computes or peisonal Internet usage); vA.I\I 
Unauthorized disclosure of confidential infonnation; 
Violation of persome1 policies; and 
Unsatisfactory performance or cnnducr 
Gossip, slanderous, or libel activities of any employee 
13EFOKR THE INDUSTRIAL COkIN1ISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MA f111I1W S ,%DAMS. 
SSN IDOL # 1399-2009 
Claimant. 1 
VS. 
ASPI':N LVATEII. IhrC., 
1 
NOTICE OF 
FILING OF APPEAL 
1 
INDUSTRIAL COI$MISSION 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: The Industrial Commission has received an appeal from a 
decision of an Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. A copy of the appeal is 
enclosed. I>ocuments that arc already part of the record or file will not be copied. 
Further action will be taken by the Industrial Commission in accordance with its Rules of 
Appellate Practice and Procedure, a copy of which is enclosed. 
PLEASE READ ALL THE RULES CAREFULLY 
The Commission will make its decision in this appeal based on the record ofthe proceedings 
before the Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. To request a briefing schedule or 
hearing, refer to Rule 4(A) and 6(A,B) of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNEMP1,OYMENT APPEALS DIVISION 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE IDAHO 83720-0041 
(208) 334-6024 
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 ilereby certify that on the 23KD day of February. 2009, a true and correct copy of the Notice 
of Filing of Appeal and compact disc of the Hearing was served by regular United States mail 
upon thc following 
MA'TStIEW S ADAMS 
4032 N IIIVERFRONT PI, 
C;ARDF:N CITY ID 83714 
ASl'EN WATER INC 
I 49 s AIIKINS WAY s.rr; I 05 
MEKIIIIAN ID 83462 
ASPEN WA'SER INC 
1960 S MII.ESI'ONE DK 13 
SAI.'I' I.,AKE CITY U?' 84101 
DEPUTY AT'rOKNEY GENERAL 
IDA1 iO I>FiPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
3 17 W MAIN STREET 
I3OISE ID 83735 
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 2 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
AlTORNEYGENERAL 
CRAIG G. BLEDSOE - 1SB# 343 1 
KATHERINE TAKASUGI - ISB# 5208 
TKAGEY K. ROLFSEN - ISB# 4050 
CHERYL GEORGE - ISB# 4213 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
3 17 W Maln Street 
Bolre, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 ext. 3 184 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE O F  IDAHO 
MATTHEW S. ADAMS, 
Claimant. 
ASPEN WATER, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
DEPARTMENT LABOR 
1 
f 
) IDOL NO. 1399-2009 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES: 
Please be advised that the undersigned Deputy Attorney General representing the Idaho 
Department of Labor hereby enters the appearance of said attorneys as the attorneys of record for 
the State of Idaho, Department of Labor, in the above-entitled proceeding. By statute, the 
Department of Labor is a party to all unemployment insurance appeals in Idaho. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1 
DATFD thls a day of February. 2009. 
Deputy ~ t tome&&eral  
Attomey for the State of Idaho, 
Department of 1,abor 
CERTlFlCATE OF MAILING 
1 HEREBY C E R T I N  that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, wa? 
mailed, postage prepaid, this W d a y  of February, 2009, to: 
MATTHEW S ADAMS 
4932 N RIVERFRONT PL 
GARDEN CITY ID 83714 
ASPEN WATER INC 
149 S ADKINS WY STE 105 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
ASPEN WATER INC 
1960 S MILESTONE DR E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
1 4 9  S ~ A D K l N S  W A Y  S T E .  1 0 5  
M E R I D I . + N ,  I D  8 3 6 4 2  
P H O N E  2 0 8 - 3 4 3 - 7 6 8 3  
F A X  2 0 8  3 2 2 - 0 4 6 1  
FACSIMILE T R A N S M I T T A L  SHEET 
Kl? YOCR R+3zERl;hiCI'. NS'MSI'II 
MATT A D M  VS "GPEE! RIAl'ER IDOI, #$ 1399-2009 
REQCET FOR HEARING 
a ;IIJROUNT 01'011 RE\'tEW PLEASE COMNEN.1. 0 I'Li.:SI: RE1'I.Y PLEASE RI<CY(:I.F, 
Attention: Unemployment Appeals Division 
Aspen Water is asking for a hearing on IWL#139PZW9. We believe that based on all the facts that we 
have provided, there 1s no reason as to why Mr  Marchbanks should have made the declsion that he did. 
We feel tbe decis~on was made based on a misunderstanding of what handbook policy our dec~sion was 
made. Mr.Marchbanks has stated that he made his decision based on 4.2 ;: iu. r ,,,._;,ci &,;d that 
policy states that if an employee has two consecutive no call and no shows it will be considered a 
voluntary resignation. Matt did show up for work and then went to a service call for one hour and then 
walked off the job without notifying anyone he was leaving for the day at 1Z:ZS p.m. 
The actual policy we are going by is 3.7 which clearly states that if employees have unexpected personal 
business to take care of, they must notify their direct supervisor to discuss time away from work and 
make arrangements as necessary. Personal business should be conducted on the employee's personal 
time. Employees who do not adhere to the break policy may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and 
including termination. Mr. Adams was provided a company cell phone so he could have communication 
at any time. Please also see all the rebuttals for each finding of Mr Marchbanks on his decision in the 
packet that was sent with the appeal. 
Thank you, 
Terry Sidwell 
F I L E D  
FED 2 7 2009 
iBUSTKii4i WlSIm 
I3EFORE: THE INDUSTK14L COMMISSION O F  T H E  STATE OF IDA130 
hlArl'lIEW S. ADAMS. ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) IDOL # 1399-2009 
VS. ) 
f 
ASI-'I:N WATER, NC.,  1 
) 
Employer, 1 
F I L E D  
MWK 0 3 BUY 
and 
I 
) INDUSTRIAL COiviMlSSiOM 
) 
CERTIFICATE O F  SERVICE 
1 hereby certifv that on the 3rd day of March, 2009 a true and correct copy ofEmployer's request 
for a new hearing, filed February 27, 2009 was served by regular United States miti1 upon the 
following: 
MATTt-IEW S ADAMS 
4032 N RIVFXFRONT PL 
GARDEN Cl1'Y ID 83714 
ASPEN WATER INC 
1960 S MILESTONE DR E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
DEPU'fY A'TTORNEY GESERAL 
IDA1 lO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STA TE HOUSE MAIL 
3 17 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
mcs 
cc:ASPEN WATER MC 
149 S ADKMS WAY STE 105 I 
MERIDIAN ID 83462 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAI, COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
i'vfATT2IISW S. ADAR4S. ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
LS.  ) IDOL # 1399-2009 
) ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
ASI~~.:N LVA'SISR, INC .> i FOR A NEW HEARING 
) 
Employer, j 
) F i L E D 
and ) 
) MAR - 5 2009 
ll>Al-10 DEPARTMEhrS OF IABOR. ) 
MWiAL W I S i O N  
Employer, t2spen Water, Inc., appeals a Decision issued by an Appeals Examiner with ldaho 
Ilcpartment oSI.abor ("IDOI," or "Department"). In that Decision, the Appeals Exanliner ruled that: 
I) Claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits; and 2) Employer's account is chargeable for 
experience rating purposes. Employer has specifically requested a new hearing to clarify which 
policy section Claimant was discharged for violating. (Employer's request, filed February 27,2009). 
Rule 8 of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure Under the ldaho En~ployment 
Security l a w  ("RAPP"), etyective as amended, February 1,2001, mandates that employers, who are 
corporations, must be represented by an attorney licensed to practice in the State of ldaho in any 
proceedings other than filing the initial appeal. Representation of another person before a public 
agency or service commission constitutes the unauthorized practice of law where the proceedings 
before those tribunals are held for purposes of adjudicating the legal rights or duties of a party. KJ& 
v. Beco, Corp., 109 ldaho 267, 707 P.2d 378 (1985), ldaho State Bar Association v. ldaho Public 
Utilities Commission, supra, Weston v. Gritman Memorial Hospital; 99 ldaho 717. 587 P.2d 1252 
[ 1978). The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that the Industrial Commission is unable to permit third 
persons unconnected with the employer entity to act in a representative capacity for the corporate 
OIZDER IjENYING REQUEST FOR A NEW HEARING - 1 20 
employer. See Idaho State Bar Association v. ldaho Public lltilities Commission, 102 Idaho 672, 
637 P.2d 1168 (1981). 
Employer is incorporated. Its specific request for a new hearing was submitted by Terry 
Sid\vcll. (Employer's request). Mr. Sidwell is not listed as an active attorney with the Ida110 State 
Bar. Thereforel Employer is not represented by legal counsel and Employer's request for a new 
hearing is not in compliance with RAPP Rule 8. As such, Employer's request for a new l~earing is 
DENIED, 
(4 DATED this 3 " f& r(rU/d) 2009. 
INDUS'I'RIAL, COMMISSION 
1 hereby certify that on 3 ,2009. a true and correct copy of Order 
Denying Request for a New Hearing was served by regular United States mail upon each of the 
following: 
MATT1 IEW S ADAMS 
4032 N RIVERFRONT PL 
GARDEN CITY ID 83714 
ASPEN WATER INC 
149 S ADKINS WAY STE 105 
MERIDIAN ID 83462 
ASPEN WATER M C  
1960 S MILESTONE DR E 
SACS LAKE CITY UT 84101 
mcs 
DEPUTYATTORNEYGENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
3 17 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
ORDER DENYING REQUES NEW HEARlNG - 2 
UEFOKE T11E INDUSTRIAL COMhllSSION OF 'i't-ll? STATIC OF I1)AIlO 
MATl'I1EW S. ADAMS. 
Claimant. 
VS. 
ASPEN WATER, JNC., 
) 
) DECISION ASD ORDER 
) 
) 
Employer. 1 
) F I L E D  
and 1 
) l4A$a 3 1 2009 
IlIAI-lO DE13AKI'MI<N'I' 01' 1-ABOR. ) .: !~~,~s:RI,IL CO?LiM!SSIOPI 
1 
lmployer. Aspen Water, Inc., appeals to the industrial Commission a Decision issucd by 
the ldaho Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department") ruling Claimant, Matthew S. Adams, 
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The Department's Appeals F<xmlincr concluded 
that: 1) Employer discharged Claimant for reasons other than employment-related misconduct; 
and. 2) Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating purposes, Employer sought an 
opportunity for a new hearing before the Commission. We addressed this request in an Order 
issued on March 5.2009 
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record as 
provided for in ldaho Code 5 72-1 368(7) and opinions issued by the ldaho Supreme Court. The 
Commission has relied on the audio recording of the hearing before the Appeals Examiner held 
on January 28, 2009, along with the Exhibits [ I  through 101 admitted into the record during that 
proceeding. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based on the testimony and the evidence in the record, the Commission adopts its o\m 
Findings of Fact as set forth below: 
DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
I. Employer's finn sells and services water soiiclling systems. Claimant started 
working for Employer as an installer in September 2007. 
2. Claimanr was a salaried employee and generally worked the ]lours of 8 9 0  a.m. - 
5.00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Claimant spent his time making service calls 
as assigned and doing paperwork at the office. 
3, installers were expected to turn in their log sheets for the prior day to Mellissa 
Miller, the office manager, before the first service call of the new day. flowever, 
Claimant was usually late in turning in his log sheets. 
4. Installers often ran personal errands between service calls. Employer expected 
installers to get permission before taking extended absences during the day, but 
not necessarily for short errands, such as trips to the bank. 
5. In October 2008, Claimant sustained a workplace injury for which he was placed 
on light duly. 
6. On November 3, 2008, Claimant made a service call at 9:jO a.m. After 
completing the service call, Claimant took a lunch break, followed by a trip to the 
"Court 1-Iouse Boise" and then back to the oflice, arriving at 12:35 p.m. (Exhibit 
4, p. 3). Claimant did some paperwork and then tunled in his log sheet to Ms. 
Miller for October 21, 2008, and November 3, 2008. Claimant spent the 
remainder of the day at the Division of Motor Vehicles getting his driver's license 
renewed. I-lowever, Claimant did not tell anyone that he was leaving and did not 
notify anyone that he would not be returning. 
7. When Claimant reported to work on November 4, 2008, l'erry Sidwell, 
Employer's owner, discharged Claimant for leaving work without permission and 
failing to notify anyone that he would not be returning. (Audio recording) 
8. Employer paid Claimant the most wages in the first four of the five calenda~ 
quarters preceding the one in which Claimant applied for benefits. (Exhibit 5). 
DISCUSSION 
Employer discharged Claimant for leaving work without contacting his supervisor 
(Audio recording). The ldaho Employment Security Law provides unemployment insurance 
benefits to claimants who become unemployed due to no failure of their own. In the case of a 
discharge, as was the cause for the separation here, the issue is whether the claimant committed 
some form of employment-related misconduct that would render him or her ineligible for 
unemployment benefits pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-1366(5). The burden of proving 
DECISION AN11 ORDER - 2 
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n~isconduct by a preponderance ofthe evidence h l l s  strictly on tlrc crriployer. &i:als lixaminer 
of Idaho Dept. of Labor v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 ldaho 3 18. 320: 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). If 
the discharging employer does not mect that burden. benefits must he awarded to the claimant. 
Roll v. City of Middleton, 105 ldaho 22, 25. 665 P.2d 721, 124 (1983); Parkcr v. St. Maries 
Plywood, 101 ldaho 415,419,614 P.2d 955, 959 (1980). 
Thcre is no dispute that Claimant was away from work for several hours o n  November 3, 
2008. Nor is there any dispute that Clailllant lefi without telling his supcwisor or anyone else 
that he was leaving for the day. Claimant maintains that he spent the afternoon at the Ilivision of 
Motor Vehicles getting his driver's license renewed and that it took far longer than hc had 
anticipated. (Audio recording). Terry Sidwell, Employer's owner, argues that Claimant should 
have at least called to let someone know that he would not be returning that day. Because 
Claimant did not return to work, Mr. Sidwell contends that Elmployer lost work that Clailnallt 
could have done. Therefore, Employer discharged Claimant on November 4, 2008. (Audio 
recording). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has established three grounds upon \vhich to determine 
\+hether Claimant has engaged in "'misconduct" as it applies to eligibility for unemployment 
benefits. Further. the Court requires the Commission to consider all three grounds in 
determining whether misconduct exists. Dietz v. Minidoka County Highway Dist., 127 ldaho 
246, 248. 899 13.2d 956, 958 (1995). We have carefully considered all thrce grounds for 
determining misconduct and conclude the issue can be disposed of under the "standards-of- 
behavior" analysis without further unnecessary explanation of the other two grounds 
tinder the "standards-of-behavior" analysis, the employer must show by a preponderance 
oi' the evidence that it communicated its expectations to the claimant, or that its expectations 
' l o w e d  normally" from the employment relationship. Further, the employer must demonstrate 
DECISION AND ORDER - 3 
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that those expectations were objectively reasonable as applied to the claimtn~t~ As the Idaho 
Supreme Court has pointed out, an "employer's expectations arc ordinarily reasonable only 
where they have been comlnunicated to the employee." 1:olks v. Moscow School District No. 
251, 129 ldaho 833, 838. 933 P.2d 642,637 (1997). 
?lovably, there is no requirement that the employer must denlon~trdte lhat the cmplo~ee's 
beha\,ior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate in his or her disregard of the 
employer's expectations. Welch v. Cowles I'ublishing Co., 127 ldaho 361, 364, 900 P.2d 1372, 
I375 (1 995). Because !he employer need not demonstrate some form of 'malice" on the part of 
the employee, what communication did or did not take between the employer and the 
claimant becomes a key element in these cases. An employee can only be held accountable for 
breaching thosc expectations that he or she understood. explicitly or implicitly, and was capable 
of satisfying. Puckett v. ldaho Department of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695 P.2d 407 (I 985). 
In cases of absent employees, the ldaho Supreme Couri has held that the employee has a 
duty to: I)  advise an employer of the reason for his or her absence; 2) seek a leave of absence: 
and 3) keep the employer informed of his or her intentions and prospects of returning to work. 
Uoran v. Employment Security Agency, 75 ldaho 95, 267 P.2d 628 (1954). Since &, the 
Court has recognized that there may be extenuating circumstances to prevent a claimant from 
seeking a leave of absence or timely communicating the reason for an absence. Therefore, the 
standard we currently apply '?s that "ood faith on the part of the employee must always appear,' 
and the employee must k c t  as a reasonably prudent person would in keeping in contact with his 
employer and in securing the permanence of his employmet~t."' Clay v. BMC West Truss Plant, 
127 ldaho 501, 503, 903 P.2d 90, 93 (1995)(Citing Doran). 
Claimant argues that it was common for installers to take time off during work to run 
pcrsonal errands and that they did not always get permission in advance. Ibwever,  Claimant 
DECISION AND ORDER - 4 
concedes that he had never taken off three hours in a single day without talking to a supervisor. 
as he did on No\,ernbcr 3, 2008 (Audio recording). Mr. S~dwell polnts out that Claimant took 
Inore than just the afternoon for personal business, noting that Clairnant's rnorning call probably 
took no more than 30 minutes to complete. 'l'herefore, between itbout 10: 15 a.m. and 12:25 p.111.. 
Cla~mant was on his lunch break, went by the "courthouse" to see about rcncwing his driver's 
license, and then returned to the office. Claimant testified that he was orlly at the courthouse 
long enough to realize the line was too long to renew his driver's license quickly. (Audio 
recording). We can take judicial notice of the fact that the 12ivision of Motor Vehicles does not 
provide services through the Ada County Courthouse in Uoisc. 'l'he Barrister location where 
C'la~mant said that he went after leaving work that afternoon was the only location in Boise 
where Clairnant could have accomplished that task. l'herefore, Clairnant's explanation for his 
whereabouts between the hours of 10: I5 a.m. and 12:25 p.m. appears inco~nplete. 
Nevertheless, the real issue here is whether Claimant's failure to contact his supervisor or 
anyone else when he left early in thc afternoon on Novernbcr 3, 2008, and did not call or return 
constituted misconduct. 'The Appeals Examiner concluded that it did not. 'The Appeals 
1:xarniner gave weight to Employer's concession that it was not ncccssary to replace Clairnant 
after he was discharged Thc Appeals Examiner was also persuaded by Clairnant's contention 
that Ernployer was in financial distress and that Mr. Sidwell was not pleased that Claimant had 
filed a worker's cornpensation clairn. In surn, the Appeals Examiner deterrnined that Ernployer 
laid Claimant off, as Claimant contends, rather than discharged Clairnant for employment-related 
misconduct. We disagree 
It rnay be true that En~ployer was in financial distress and that the business was able to 
continue functioning with two installers rather than three after discharging Clairnant. It also rnay 
be that Mr. Sid\vell was not pleased that Clairnant filed a worker's cornpensation clairn 
DECISION AND ORDER - 5 
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Ilowever, these conditions do not cxcuse Claimant from leaving work in the middle of the day 
without permission or other communication. I~mployers have a reasonable expectation that their 
enlployees will work the hours that they are scheduled. That expectation in this case did not 
"vanish" becanse E~nployer nay have been having financial problems. 
Clairnant's failure to report for work as expected without contacting his supervisor, 
regardless of the reason for his absence, fell below the reasonable standard Employer was 
entitled to expect. That behavior resulted in Clairnant's discharge. Therefore. we conclude that 
1.1nplo)er discharged Clairnant for employ~nent-related misconduct. Claimant is ineligible for 
unernployrncnt insurance benefits. 
In this case, Employer paid the most wages to Claimant during the last four base quarters. 
(Exh~bit 5). Idaho Code 572-135 1(2)(a) providcs that an enlployer's experience ratcd account is 
chargeable for benefits paid to a claimant whose separation frorn ernployrnent resulted frorn 
discharge for reasons other than rniscondnct or a voluntary separation for good cause. Because 
\\e conclude that Ernployer discharged Clairnant for reasons other than ernployrncnt-related 
m~sconduct, we find that Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating purposes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 
We conclude that Ernployer discharged Clairnant for employment-related misconduct. 
11 
We further conclude that Employer's account is not chargeable for experience rating 
purposes. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Decision of the Appeals Examiner is REVERSED, 
and Clairnant is ineligible for unernployrncnt bencfirs. This is a final order under Idaho Code 5 
DECISION AND ORDER - 6 
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I>A'I'ED this , a ~ day of ~ --.- ~ ,2009 
ININS I'IIIAL COMMISSION 
1 hereby certify that on the day of --___ k p f l  , 2009 a true and correct 
d States rnail upon each of the 
following: 
MATTIIIIW S /\DAMS 
4032 N RIVERFRONT PL 
(iAKI)EN CI'TY 111 837 14 
ASPEN WAI'ER INC 
149 S ADKTNS WAY STIi 105 
MERIDIAN ID 83462 
ASPEN WA'I'ER INC 
1960 S MII.I:STONE DR E 
SALT LAKE CITY 1!T 84 l 01 
DEPUTY ATTOKN1':Y GENERAL 
IDAIIO DEI'AR'I'MENT OF LA130K 
STA TE NOUSE h-IAZI< 
3 17 W MAIN STREET 
1301SE ID 83735 
rncs 
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Merrily Munther (ISB # 1908) 
MI:NTIIER <;OODRUM, CHIK~'ERED 
'The Mallard Building, Suite 350 
, . '  1 16 1 West River Street , , , ~  
Boise, Idaho 81702 
. . 
4 1 elephone: (208) 344-4566 
-4; Facsimile: (208) 333-9836 
< Email: mrnunther/o)mpsle~al.cotn 
c?3 
Attcorneys Ibr Clairnant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRliZI. COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF 1I)AHO 
MA'TI'HEW S. AIjAMS, 
VS. 
ASPEN WA'I'ER. INC. 
and 
) 1U01, No. 1309-2009 
Claimant. ) 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
Employer, ) 
) 
'10: The above-named parties: 
f'lease be advised that Merrily Munther, of the fim of MIJKTAER GOODRUM, 
CIIARTERED, hereby enters her appearance as attorneys of record for the Clairnant, Matthew S. 
Adams, in the above-entitled proceeding. 
DATED this -bd day of April 2009. 
MUNTHER C;OODRUM, CHARTERED 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE --- 1 
CI?RI'IFICATE OF SERVICE 
- d, I, thc undersigned. certilj. that on the ik-,~.... day of April 2009, 1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTIC:E OF AIT~;AR,INCE to be forwarded, with all required charges 
prepaid, by the mdhodjs) indicated below: 
Mr. Larry Sidwell 
ASPEN WK~'ER, IV(;. 
dba Aspcn Water litah 
1960 Milestone Drive 8 E  
Salt L,&e City, U1' 84014 
-~ .~ 
~ 
~ 
~~~~ ~ 
-. 
Mr. Terry Sidwell i-land Delivery 
Craig G. Bledsoe. Csq. 
Katherine Takasugi, Esq. 
7'racey K. Rolsfsen, t.:sq. 
Cheryl George, 13sq. 
I ~ . 4 t l O  DEPARTMENT OF L.4BOR 
3 17 West Main Street 
Boise, tdaho ~ 83735 
ASPEN W;C~'F,R, IN(:. 
dba Aspen Water of Idaho 
1 land llelivery 
U.S. Mail 7 
Facsi rni le -- 
Ernail 
- 
I1.S. Muil v' 
E'acsirnile 
Fland I>elivcry 
U.S. Mail 
Eacsirnile 
Ernail 
Overnight Mail 
149 South hdkins \Va)8, Suite 105 lmail  
Meridian, 113 83642 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
LAWKENCI' G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRAIG G. BLEDSOE - ISB# 343 1 
KATHERINE TAKASUGI - ISB# 5208 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN - ISB# 4050 
CHERYL GEORGE - ISB# 421 3 
Deputy Attorneys Genera1 
Idaho Departrnent of 1.abor 
3 17 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 ext. 3432 
BEFORE THE 1NI)USTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MATTHEW S. ADAMS, 
Claimant, 
VS. 
ASPEN WATER, INC., 
Ernployer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
Respondent. 
) IDOL No. 1399-2009 
) IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
) LABOR'S MOTION TO 
) RECONSIDER 
F I L E D  
) 
1 APR I O MQ9 
COMES NOW, the ldaho Departrnent of Labor, by and through its attorney of 
record, Tracey K. Rolfsen, Deputy Attorney General, hereby rnoves the Industrial 
Comrnission of the State of ldaho to reconsider the Decision and Order filed in this case 
on March 3 1,2009, as authorized by Idaho Code section 72-1368(7) 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
'The Department of Labor (the "Department") does not seek to change the 
substantive issues decided by the Industrial Cornmission ("Cornmission"), but seeks to 
correct an inconsistency in the Commission's Decision and Order reversing the Appeals 
Examiner's Decision that appears to be in error. In its Conclusions of Law, the 
Commission concluded that Employer, Aspen Water, Inc.. discharged Claimantl Matthew 
Adams, for employment-related rnisconduct and that Employer's account was not 
chargeable for experience rating purposes. (Decision and Order, p. 6) However. in its 
discussion. the Commission concluded, "Because we conclude that Ernployer discharged 
Clairnant for reasons other than ernployrnent-related misconduct, we find that Employer's 
account is chargeable for experience rating purposes." (Decision and Order, p. 6). 
This sentence appears to be a typographical error. Based on the foregoing. the 
Department respectfully requests the Cornrnission to correct and arnend the above excerpt 
of the Cornmission's Decision and Order. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 2009 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Deputy ~ttom-I 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 2009. 1 served the foregoing 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER in the rnanner set forth below upon: 
U.S. Mail: 
MATTHEW S ADAMS 
4012 N RIVERFRONT PL 
GARDEN CITY ID 83714 
ASPEN WATER INC 
149 S ADKINS WY STE 105 
MERIDIAN ID 83462 
ASPEN WATER INC 
1960 S MILESTONE DR E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84 101 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Merrily Munther (ISB # I  908) 
MI:~; .~NFR GOODKURZ, C~IAR~-EKIED 
'fhe Mallard Building. Suite 350 
I 161 West River Street 
Boise, ldaho 83702 
4 felephone: (208) 344-3566 
Facsirnile: (208) 344-9876 
Ernail: mrnunther/dngs~e~d~.eorn 
- 
m ,4ttorncys for Claimant 
(=a 
BEFORE THE INDUS1'RIAL COMMlSSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MA II'IIIJW S. AIIAMS, ) IDOL # 1399-2009 
) 
Cla~  rnant, 
VS ) 
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST 
ASPEN WA TFR. INC ) FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Lmployer, 
And ) 
IDA1 I 0  DEPARTMENT 01: LABOR. 
1 
COMES h'OW the Clairnant and rnokes this hody for reconsideration of its Decision and 
Order dated March 3 I, 2009. 
The burden of proving employment-related misconduct which would disqualify an 
employee frorn recei\,ing unemployment compensation benefits lies with the employer. Idaho 
Code 572- 1366(e). Folks v. Moscow School District No. 28 1, 129 ldaho 833, 933 P.2d 642 
(1997). 
What this case cornes down to is \vhether the Clairnant was guilty of employment-related 
misconduct when he failed to obtain prior perrnission to go to the DMV to renew his driver's 
license. 
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'The Clairnant testified that there was no one in the office when the Claimant lefi to go 
back to the DA,fV (he testified he had gone there in the morning and found it was too crowded to 
wait): so there was no one at the office to notify wherc he was going. He also knew that the 
ownerlmanagers knew how to reach him, as they ofien did. Mrs. Sidwell. nee Miller, was unsure 
whether she was there at that tirne. but the Clairnant said there WAY no one there and she did not 
deny it. The witness testilicd that she was sorting through papers on her desk and when she saw 
,he i,,un taus there, she found his log sheets and realized the Clairnant was gone. It is. therefore, 
obvious that Mrs. Sidwell was not at her desk in the office when the Clairnant left. 'fhere is no 
other tcstirnony to the contrary. Both Mr. and Mrs. Sidwell adrnitted that they knew how to 
reach the Claimant: as is apparent frorn the fact that Mr. Sidwell called the Clairnant on his 
company-furnished cell phone at 2:41 o'clock p.m., approximately forty (40) rninutes after the 
Clairnant testified that he lett the office. 'They, therefore. knew where he was at that tirne. 'l'here 
was no rnention in that telephone conversation of work being available to the Clairnant, or to his 
being needed. but even if there had been work available; both Mr. and Mrs. Sidwell knew how to 
reach hirn. Mr. Sidwell testified that ernployees [on the road ... doing installations] were 
supposed to call in regularly "and, if 1 didn't hear frorn thern. I would call them ....( emphasis 
added)." tie never indicated in his testirnony that he ever admonished any ernployee who had 
not called in, so how was it that the Clairnant should have known that prior permission was 
required if it had not been previously required? Indeed, the company's practice of allowing 
ernployees to do personal errands led the Clairnant to believe that it was okay, since he knew he 
could be reached at any tirne. 
Again, the Industrial Cornrnission noted in its Decision and Order in this case, "'The 
Idaho Suprerne Court has pointed out, an 'employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only 
where they have been cornrnunicated to the employee.'" Folks v. Moscow School District No. 
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281. 139 Idaho 831, 838, 933 1'.2d 632, 647 (1997)'" 'The Claimant testified that he and other 
-. 
installers took time during the work day to dct personal errands because they were always 
available by telephone if needed for work. He also testified that sonietirnes they did not seek 
prior permission. Again, the installers could always he reached by phone. That testimony is 
unrefuted. 'fhe employer's witnesses did not testify that employees always had prior permission 
to leave the office during the day. nor could they, because it was not true. 
Within a relatively short tinie of the Clairnant's departure froni the office, uhere no one 
was working from wl~oni he could get permission, thc Clairnant's eniployer contacted him while 
he waited in line at the DMV. Mr. Sidwell knew the Claimant was available for work at any 
tinie he was needcd. Iiis eniployer said nothing about needing him for work that day. It is 
undisputed that the Claimant was on work related business, renewing his driwr's license, for the 
remainder of the day, but it is also unrefuted that he was available for work and his eniployer 
knew of his whereabouts for all but fort> (40) minutes. Even during that forty (40) minutes it 
was admitted that he could be reached on the conlpany's phone 
'The Claimant's testimony that he was an exemplary employee is not disputed. Ffe 
testified in Exhibit 9, page 1 of 20. that he "had an exceptional record at Aspen Water for 
attendance. adherence to company policies, performance and behavior," but "these were not 
taken into consideration at the tinie of my termination as the employee Ilandbook states they will 
be." 
Section 3.1 3 Corrective Action. 
Aspen Water Inc holds each of its en~ployees to certain work rules and 
standards of conduct (see Section 4). When an enlployee deviates &om these 
rules and standards. Aspen water Inc. expects the employee's supervisor to take 
corrective action. 
Corrective action at Aspen Water Inc. is progressive. The action taken in 
response to a rule infraction or violation of standards typically follows a pattern 
increasing in seriousness until the infraction or violation is corrected. 
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The usual sequence of corrective actions includes a verbal warning, a 
written warning, and finally termination of employment. In deciding which initial 
corrective action would be appropriate, a supervisor will consider the seriousness 
of the infraction, thc circumstances surrounding the matter, and the employee's 
previous record. In the case of a serious infraction Aspen Water n~aintains the 
right to initiate any level of corrective action. ... Though committed to a 
progressive approach to corrective action; Aspen Water considers certain rule 
infractions and violations of standards as grounds for immediate termination of 
eniployment. These include but are not limited to: thef in any form, 
insubordinate behavior, abuse of a customer or co-worker, sexual discrimination 
or harassment, causing a hostile work environment; vandalism or destruction of 
company property, being on conipany property during non-business hours: the use 
of company equipment and/or company vehicles without prior authorization by 
1;xecutive Staff, untruthfulness about personal work history, skills. or training, 
di~~ulging Company business practices, and misrepresentations of Aspen Water 
Inc. to a customer: a prospective customer, the general public, or an eniployee. 
'The Claimant does not contend that the Industrial Conlniission requires enlployers to 
follow their own progressive discipline policy / ~ Thc question is one of expectations and whether 
the employer's expectations were reasonable when eniployees had been allowed to run personal 
\ 
or business errands previously without obtaining prior permission.) l'he Claimant had never 
I 
received any uaming. verbal or mritten. Me testified that 
... i t  was not uncommon for employees to take care of personal matters 
(niy driver's licensel which is required for my driving of the company van) when 
they had no assignments so these would be completed when we received an 
assignment. I always had the conipany cell phone on my person. Aspen Water 
could have let me know there was work to do. The present installer, Corey Cook, 
would take extended lunches and take care of personal business when there was 
no work scheduled. Past eniployee, Blake Daniels, was able to do the same. JVe 
were never questioned about personal tinze during the day and it izras never 
hidden,/rom management. In fact, it was openly talked about. As long as it did 
not interfere with scheduled installs or service calls it was a non-issue. Terry 
stated during the suntnzer of 2008 that he understood the instal1er.s not being able 
to schedule tiwe oJf in advance due to our scheduling and knew tl7ut we /?ad to 
rake care c?fper.sorzal business during the regulur work week." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Mr. Sidwell acknowledged that this was a one-time incident. On at least one ( I )  prior 
occasion, the Claimant testified that Mr. Sidwell had seen hiin at the bank; presumably without 
obtaining prior permissionl and Mr. Sidwell said nothing to him about not having permission. 
Illis case is about reasonable expectations. 'The Claimant testified that he and other 
employee-installers did personal business during work hours on a regular basis, with the 
Imo\\rledge of management, and were encouraged to do this so these errands would be completed 
when they received an assignment, It was not reasonable for the company to terminate the 
Clain~ant for conduct for which he and other employees had not been previously disciplined. 
when management's actions condoned conduct that w-ould otl~erwise have violatcd a company 
policy. Moreover, in this instance: althougl~ the Claimant referred to it as personal business, the 
renewal of his driver's license was a requirement of the Clainiant's position and something he 
could not do on his own personal time. He was accessible by phone and available for work at 
any time, and managcment knew this. 
Like the claimant in m: this was a single incident of comparatively nonscrious action 
which should not disqualify the Claimant from receiving benefits. 'I'he Court said in m, 
"hlt l~ougl~ an employer's expectation that an employee will not engage in 'protracted argument' 
with his employer is objectively reasonable, a 'single incident of comparatively nonserious 
disrespect by complainant and arguing is not misconduct.'" Id. At 614-1 5, 549 P.2d at 273-74. 
Because the employer had previously allowed employees to run personal errands without 
always obtaining prior permission. the employer's expectations as to the standards of behavior of 
obtaining permission in advance was not objectively reasonable, particularly where it was a 
single incident. hiloreover, the errand was an essential requirement of the Claimant's position. 
This is different than the facts in Doran v. Emplovment Securitv Agency, 75 Idaho 94, 
267 P.2d 628 (1954): which the Commission cites in support of its decision. In b, the 
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claimant had been warned on prior occasions about tiis temporary absences in which he failed to 
return to work afier running a personal errand at 1030 in the morning and was found, at home. 
drunk. Fie returned to work the next day and was admonished. A week later he disappeared and 
did not contact his employer for a week. ltiese facts me quite different from those here, where 
the Claimant left to go to the DMV to renew his driver's license. which he already knew would 
take several hours because of his stop that inorning to try to do it in a short time. 'There was no 
one in the office to notify, and the employer had previously encouraged enlployces to do 
personal business when they did not have assignments. It was not like he could not be reached if 
an a~signment had arisen. His employer contacted him while he was waiting in line at the I>MV 
and said nothing to him about an assignment. IIe had typically been reached by his employer by 
telepl~one, since he was frequently driving his van on other assignments. 'I'11e quote from the 
case of C l a m B M C  West Truss Plant, 127 Idaho 501, 503, 903 P.2d 90: 93 (1 995), would seem 
to be inapposite since it involved the determination of benefits in a voluntary termination case. 
h4ore appropriate is Davis v. lloward 0. Miller Conipany, 107 Idaho 1092, 695 P.2d 
1231 (1985), in which the Supreme Court upheld the Industrial Conimission's granting of 
unemploynient benefits to a manager who temporarily absented himself without notifying the 
head office. The Court noted that absences were tolerated by the Conipany over a period of 
several months and evidently no manager was told that substitt~tions were against company 
policy. It was apparently "not unusual for station managers at other local stations owned by Mr. 
Miller to leave their scheduled shifts without official notice to the head office. Such absences 
appeared to be allowed witl~out recrimination as long as a manager arranged for a replacement in 
.. his absence.- 
The Court in acknowledged that "some expectations and duties 'flow normally 
ffoni an eniploynient relationship.' Other expectations l~owever, do not 'flow naturally.' If 
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certain practices or expectations are not coininon anlong enlployees in gene~.al or within a 
particular enterprise, and have not been commuilicated by the employer to the employee, they 
cannot serve as a proper bayis for a charge of employee misconduct." In this instance, the 
expectation that employees would conduct personal business during working hours was not only 
common but specifically encouraged by the management. 'ferry Sictwell testified that he always 
expected employees to obtain permission, but at the same time said that if he did not hear from 
an employee. he would contact ihem. 'l'here was no testimony froin Mr. or Mrs. Sidwell that the 
Clainiant or other employees were admonished when they did not have prior permission. 
although Mr. Sidwell's testimony i~nplies that he was awarc that this did occur. Although the 
Claimant testified that he and other installers had run errands without obtaining prior permission, 
Mr. Sidwell did not deny this and also did not provide evidence that employees who had done so 
previously had been adnionishect or sanctioned. 
In its Decision and Order, the Commission concluded that the "Claimant's failure to 
report fbr work as expected without contacting his supervisor, regardless of the reason for his 
. . absence, fell below the reasonable standard ISmployer was entitled to expect." Rut in this ease, 
i~ 
as in Davis, the employer had not cornmunicated its expectations to its employees artcr allowing, 
and even encouraging, installers to run personal errands when they did not have appointments for 
installation. It w a ~  also undisputed that sonietinies they did so without prior permission) / 
In its Decision, the Commission, perhaps inadvertently, casts the Claimant in a bad light 
by its assumptioil of facts not in evidence. The Commission took judicial notice of the fiact that 
"the Division of Motor Vehicles does not provide services through the Ada County Courthouse 
in Boise." Nowhere in the hearing did the Claimant say that he went to the Ada County 
Courthouse. He said he went to the "courthouse" and to the " D M V .  This is how the Barrister 
public building is known to some people froni the days that it housed the traffic court and then 
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the juvenile court. "'The court house and 1:)MV are the same," according to the Claimant's 
undisputed testimony. To suggest that he said he went to the Ada C:onnty Corii-thouse to rcnew 
his driber's license casts a bad light on the Claimant. 
Rule 201(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides that, "A judicially 
noticed fact niust be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (I) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable 
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
be reasonably questioned. 
It was not appropriate to take judicial notice of a fact when a witness could have been mistaken 
in his identification oi'a public building rather than being deceptive, which is how thc opinion of 
the Industrial Commission made the Claimant sound. In this case "courthouse" ineant onc thing 
to the witness and another to the Co~nmission, and neither was inconcct. Judicial notice is not 
appropriate where a fact is susceptible to inore than one interpretation. '1.0 do so attributes 
inappropriate motives to the Claimant. who was merely trying to renew his driver's license, 
which was a requirenient of his position as an installer (Audio recording). 
What the Conimission should have titken judicial notice of is that the niotor \chicle 
licensing burcau is only open on weekdays between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. (see attached from 
Idaho Transportation Departnlent website), the sarnc hours that the Claimant ordinarily worked 
(Audio recording). The only way for the Claimant to renew his driver's license was to take time 
froni work, and w11en it is crowded? it could take several hours, as it did here. Indeed; the 
Claimant canie back to the office in the morning after stopping at the DMV and detennining that 
the renewal process was going to take longer than a short whilc. IIe worked until approxiniately 
2:00 p.m. After checking to see whether there was installation work for him to do and, finding 
none, he left to take care of this matter, an essential one to his employment, while he had no 
assignments. 
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We believe that the Industrial Commission incorrectly stated that the Appeals 1-xaminer 
had decided the Claimant was laid off. 'fhe Appeals Examiner did not so state in his opinion. 
What the Appeals Examiner stated was, "?'he ljcts that the claima~lt had recently suffered 
a work related injury and that the employer was able to adjust their operation to get the work 
done with half thi: n ~ ~ n ~ b e r  of installers sugge.sts the employer would be mtrtivuted to end the 
claimant's employment for reasons other than his porportect resiglation." jI<mpl~asis upplied.) 
'I'he decision states only, l~owevcr, that, "The clairnant was discharged, but not for misconduct." 
All this means, of course, is that the employer Cdiled in its burden of' proof. 
There are times when there is evidence of motives on the part of the employer other than 
the basis for the t~ltiniate decision of the Commission or Supreme Court. In m, for example, 
there was evidence that the claimant was discharged as a result of the employer's fears that the 
Claimant would quit his job without giving them notice. 'Illis, the Supreme Court noted, would 
not render the Clainiant ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Similarly, if the 
Claimant here had been laid o f f - -  as the evidence suggested - he would have been eligible for 
unemploynient benefits. Iiowevcr: in this case the examiner did not conclude that the Clainiant 
was laid off hut, rather: that he was discharged hut not for misconduct within the meaning of the 
employnient security laws. 
'The real question here is whether the employer's expectations were objectively 
reasonable in light of all the facts presented at the hearing before the Appeals Examiner. We 
subniit they were notl particularly because the Employer admitted that he encouraged employees 
to run personal errands and did not deny that sometimes they did so without prior permission. 
The Claimant submits that the case is more appropriate than b, and that 
applying the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in I-, the employer's expectations 
here were not reasonable in light of its practice of permitting employees to run personal errands, 
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sometiines without prior permission. 'fhat rnucli evidence is not in dispute and, accordingly: it is 
appropriate that the Corn~nission reconsider its 1)ecision and Order: and allow benefits to the 
Claimant. 
DATED this of April 2009 
M ~ . N I  PIER ~ O O D R ~ ~ M ,  C f % 4 ~ 1 F R E l l  
Attorncys for &aimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-ill I, the undersigned, certify that on the day of April 2009, 1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing C L A l z l . 4 ~ r ' S  REQllEST FOK RF:CO'VSII)EKATION to be fixwarded with all 
required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Mr. Terry Sidwell 
ASPEN ~ . ~ T E R ,  INC. 
dba Aspen Water of Idaho 
149 South Adkins Way, Suite 105 
t Meridian, ID 83642 
i--- - ~ 
I Mr. Lany Sidwell 
ASPEN W ~ T E R ,  INC. 
dba Aspen Water Utah 
1960 Milestone Drive #E 
City, UT 84014 
Craig G. Bledsoe, Esq. 
Katherine Takasugi, Esq. 
Tracey K. Rolsfsen, Esq. 
Cher) l George, Esq. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
3 17 West Mairi Street 
Boise. Idaho 83735 
-- 
-- 
Iiand ~ e l  i\ e;.; 
IJ.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
Overnight Mail 
Iland Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
1:acsirnile 
7 1 
Email 
Overnight Mail 
- - 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
Overnight Mail 
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Idaho Driver License Coun -e Locations Page I o f  3 
Idaho Transportation Department 
DMV HOME ldaho Driver's License 
ON-UNE SERVICES Office Locations and Phone Numbers 
NEW TO IDAHO? Office hours vary at some locations and are subject to 
frequent changes. 
DRIVER SERVICES 
VEHICLE SERVICES 
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE 
SERVICES 
DRNER UCEMING 
OFFICES 
OmCES 
I N F O M T I O N  FOR 
IDAHO MILITARY 
PERSONNEL 
MANUALS 
LINKS 
RECENT LEGlSLATlON 
IDAHO MOTOR VEHICLE 
LAWS 
W N .  RULES 
VOTER REGlSTPAnON 
DMV HISTORY 
TRUCIONG.IDAHO.GOV 
BUTTE 
CAMPS 
CANYON 
Arco 
Fairf ield 
Ca ldwd l  
256 W Grand Ave 
119 W Wi l low St 
6618 Cleveland Blvd, Suite 
E 
527- 
8553 
764- 
2261 
454- 
7487 
9 t o  5 
8 t o  5 
8 t o  5 
9 t o  4 
8 t o 5  
8 t o  4 
9 t o  4 
8 t o 2  
8 t o  3:30 
4932 N Riverfront PI 
Garden City, U) 8371 4 
(208) 409-9001 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
MATTIlEW S. ADAMS. 
VS. 
ASPEN WATER, INC 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
I am requesting that my unenlployment insurance case be taken to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
IDOL i(i 1399-2009 for Matthew S. Adarns vs. Aspen Water, Inc. and Idaho Dept. of Labor. 
A response concerning the Industrial Conirnissions decision was sent by my attorney on April 
20, 2009. This request to review the reversal is still pending as of May 08,2009. May 12, 2009 
is the last day for me to request that the Idaho Supreme Court review and make a final decision 
on this matter. 
Enclosed are two checks. $50.00 to the Lndustrial Commission and $86.00 to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
As Mary at the Industrial Commission stated, I will receive any and all forms and requested 
information after the appeal has been processed. 
Matthew S. Adams 
SSN
CERTIFICATE OF SERVXCE 
I. the undersigned, certify that on the &day of May 2009,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAI, by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Mr. Teny Sidwell Hand Deliver 
ASPEN WATER, INC. 1J.S. Mail 
dba Aspen Water of Idaho Facsimile 
x 
- 
149 South Adkins Way. Suite 1 05 Email  
Meridian, ID 83642 Overnight Mail -- 
Mr. Larry Sidwell Hand Deliver 
ASPEN WATER, INC. U.S. Mail 
dba Aspen Water Utah Facsimile 
1 
- 
1960 Milestone Drive JIE Email 
Salt Lake City, UT 84014 Overniyht Mail - 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S. Clearwater Lane 
Boise, ID 8371 2 
Eland Deliver 
U.S. Mail A- 
Facsimile 
Etnail 
Overnight Mail 
&-flee- - ,--4 d - - 2  
Matthew S. Adarns 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VS. 
ASPEN WATER WC 
1 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 3650 1 
) CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
) 
EmployerRespondent, 
1 .... 
j , .. and .> 
j -- . ,, 
IDAFIO DEPAR'1'MEN'T OF LABOR, 1 . 3 
. ' 
Respondent. 1 - 
M 
-- 1 
Appeal From: Idaho Industrial Commission, 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman, presiding. 
Case Number: IDOL #I 399-2009 
Order Appealed from: 
Representative for Claima~t: 
Representative for Employers: 
Decision and Order filed March 3 1.2009 
Claimant filed a Reconsideration on April 20,2009 
which is pending before the Industrial 
Commission. Idaho Department of Labor filed a 
Reconsideration on April 10,2009 which is pending 
before the Industrial Commission. 
Mattbew S. AdarnsPro Se 
4932 N. Riverfront P1 
Garden City, ID 837 14 
Terry Sidwell 
Aspen Water of Idaho 
149 S Adkins Way 
Meridian Id 83642 
Representative for IDOL: Tracey K. Rolfsen 
Deputy Attorney General 
3 1 7 W. Main Street 
Boise Idaho 83735 
A d a m s ,  M a t t h e w  IDOL 1399  
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - I 
Appcaled By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fre Paid: 
'Transcript: 
Dated: 
Matthew S. AdamsIAppellant 
Aspen Water, Inc./Respondents 
and 
Idaho Department of LaborRespondent 
May 12,2009 
Adans, Matthew IDOL 1399 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 
I, Mary Schoeler, the undersigned Assistat>t Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Comn~ission of the Statc of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal filed May 12,2009; Decision and Order, filed hilarch 3 1,2009; 
and the w-hole thereof Pending before the Industrial Commission is Claimant's 
Reconsideration, filed April 20,2009 (copy attaclied), and the Idaho Department of Labor's 
Reconsidcratio~i filed April 10,2009 (copy attached). 
DA'TEU: May 14,2009 
~ s s i s b n t  Commission Secretary 
1 
Adams, Matthew 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Claimant, 
ASPEN WATER, 1NC , 
Employer, 
and 
ORDER REGARDING 
MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
F I L E D  
IDAf-lO I3EPAKTMICN'f 01: IABOIi. 1 Mkf 2 26 2089 
j 
, -  3 ,  j , .  S'itN smt.>~a, ~ j I , 4 ~  : ,",,, 2!$ju~L* 
.fhis order addresses two motions for reconsideration filed in the above entitled case. First, 
w to correct an error in tire ldalio Dcpartlnent of Labor (IDOL) filed a Mohon to Rccons~der seekln, 
the discussion of the industrial Cornmission's Decision and Ordcr filed March 3 1, 2009. Sccond, 
Cla~mant, tliough counsel, filcd a motion requestingthe Commission reconsider its dccision and find 
that Employer's expcctat~ons were not object~vely reasonable in light of all the facts. 
The Cornnnss~on D c c ~ s ~ o n  a i d  Order reversed the Appeals Examiner's Dec~s~on .  The 
Conimiss~on found that Employcr d~scharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct and that 
Employer's account 1s not chargeable for experience rating purposcs. 
Claimant worked as an installer of Employer's water softening systems. Installers oftcn ran 
personal errands bctwccn service calls. Employer expected installers to get permission before taking 
extended '~bsences dunng tlie day. but not nccessanly for short crrands, such as tnps to the bank. On 
November 3, 2008, Claimant made a scrvice call at 9:30 a.m. After completing the service call 
Claimant took a lunch break, stopped by the Division of Motor Vehicles to renew his driver's 
licensc, and then retumcd lo the office at 12:35 p.m. Claimant was unable to renew his license 
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hecausc the line was too long, so after complct~ng soine paperwork, Claimant returned to the DMV 
Claimant did t~o t  tell anyone that he was leavlng and that he would not be returmng 
When Clamant amved at the office the next morning, Teny S~dwell, Employer's owner, 
discharged Claimant for leabing work without permission and failing to notify anyone that he would 
not be returning. Claimant conceded that while it was common to run personal errands, he had never 
talien offthrec hours in a single day w~lhoul talk~ng to a supervrsor, as he d ~ d  on November 3,2008 
'The Comtnission found that Employer had a reasonable expectation that Claimant would 
work the hours that lie was scheduled. Claimant's failure to report for work as expected without 
contacting his supervisor, regardless of the reason for the absence, fell below the reasonable standard 
Employer was entitled to expect. Therefore, the Commission concluded that Employer discharged 
Claimant for employnlent-related misconduct. 
IDOL'S Motion to Reconsider 
The Conimission will first address DO1,'s motion to reconsider. DOI, argues that the last 
sentence in the discussion is a typographical error. JDOL is correct in pointing out themisstatements 
in the last sentence of the second full paragraph on page 6 ofthe Decision and Order. The incorrect 
sentence states, "Because we conclude that Employer discharged Claimant for reasons other than 
employnient-related misconduct, we find that Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating 
purposes." That sentence is contradictory to the discussion and conclusions. Accordingly, the 
Comtnission grants DOL's motion for reconsideration and orders that the following sentence he 
substituted for the last sentence in the discussion section on page 6 of the Decision and Order. 
Because we conclude that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related 
misconduct, we find that Employer's account is not cllargeahle for experience rating 
purposes. 
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Claimant's Request for Reconsideration 
Next the Commission will address Claimant's request Tor reconsideratioil. Claimant first 
argues that applying the principles in the case, Employer's expectations here were not 
rcasorlable in light of its practice ofpermitting employees to mn personal errands. Davis v. Iioward 
0. . Miller . - -- .. Co=* .. . . 107 id&o 1092,695 P.2d 123 1 (1985). 
In &v&, the C:ommission found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that Davis was discharged 
as a result of cn~ployer's Sears that Davis would quit his job without giving employer notice, after 
employer discovered that claimant had quit a previous job without giving notice, rather than for 
~nisconduct in failing to list prior einploymcnt on cmploymenl applicatioii. The Supreme Court 
further hcld that while the employer believed that Davis was absent from work without proper notice 
lo thc head office, ihc employcr did not infonn Davis oftheir expectations and thel-eforc, there was 
no dclibcrate violation ofthe employer's rules. in m, the record established that "there was no 
violation of any rule or expectation that was the custom of this particular business, or any deviation 
rrotn how 'managers' in general schedule their absences, or from [employer's] specific instructions 
to his managers." Id, at 1095. 
Davis was a gas station manager. Davis occasionally took one to two hours a week off from 
his shift, substituting other personnel in his placc. The en~ploycr alleged, but the evidence failed to 
support, that Davis was expected to let his employer know if he would be gone from work. 
The case is distinguishable from the present case because Davis was amanager and he 
was absent in a way that was not a deviation from how managers in gcneral schedule their absences. 
When Davis was absent he scheduled another employee to work. Claimant was not a manager and 
did not have the authority to have another employee fill in for his absence. Further, Claimant admits 
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that he liacl never taken offtlrrce hours in a single day without talking to a supenisor. 
'The record does not establish that Employer communicated its expectation that Claimant ask 
for permission before taking an extended absence, though Employer may have done so. Evcn so, the 
Colnmission iinds that an employer has a reasonable expectation that an employee will show up for 
work ant1 stay at work, and tl~at such an expectation flows iraturally from the employment 
I-elationship. Claimant left work in tlie middle of the day without pcnnission and did not return. 7 % ~  
aiternoon absence by Claimant was not a shon personal errand that was commitllly allowed by 
Enlploycu. E~nploycrs havc a reasonable expectation that employec will work the hours they are 
scheduleti and Claimant's afternoon off fell below that reasonable standard. Evcn Claimant 
acknowledged that liis abscnce on the day in question was different in character from thc brief 
absences tolerated by i-Z~nploycr. 
Claimant also argies that he had typically been reached by Employer by telephone, since he 
was frequently driving his van on other assignments. While it may he true that Clainxdnt was 
reached by telephone during his absence, being reached by phone is not the same as physically being 
present at work or hcing out on assignment for work. 
Additionally, Claimant states that this was a single incident of non-serious action which 
should not disqualify Claimant from receiving benefits. The Supreme Court has stated that 
"altl~ough an employer's expectation that an employee will not engage in 'protracted argument' with 
his crnployer is objectively reasonable, a 'single incident of comparatively non-serious disrespect by 
complaining and arguing is iiot misconduct."' Folks v. Moscow School Dist. No. 28 1, 129 Idaho 
833, 837, 933 P.2d 642, 646 (1997). The Court has also stated that "although the existence of a 
pattern of conduct is certainly a factor to be considered, neither Folks nor Gatherer dictate that a 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION- 4 
pattenl ofco~~ducl  is ~lecessary to determine that reasonable of the employer's expectatioils." m a  
y.ij_est Values,JncC, 132 Idaho 432,436,974 P.Zd 78,S2 (1 999). There is no requirement to prove a 
pattern of conduct in order to prove misconduct. Tlie Coinmission's Decision and Order found that 
Eniployer had a reasonable expectation that Clairna~~t not leave tbr tlucc hours in the aftenloon 
without notifying Employer. 
There was some disputc ovcr whether Claimant was at the courthouse or the DMV during the 
afternoon in question. The Conimission took judicial noticc that the Division of Motor Vehicles 
does not providc scrviccs through the Ada Cou~ity Courthouse, Claimant avers that this casts 
Claimant in a bad light. Regardless ofwhere Claimant was, the courthouse or the DMV, tlierelevmt 
point is tliat he was not at work. 
Clai~nant's arguments in his request for reconsideration do not persuade the Commission to 
alter its ruling. 'The Commission finds no reason to disturb the conclusions in the Decision and 
Order in this matter. 
Based upon t l~e  foregoing reasons, IDO1,'s Motion to Reconsider is hereby GRANTED and 
the Commission's Decision and Order filed Marc11 31, 2009, is modified as detailed above; 
Claima~~t's Request for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this -& day of 2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMlSSlON 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman 
-/ 
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pleadingsl documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record on appeal by 
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YOU ARE 1iEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), ldaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been served 
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